So this is
the physicalist's thesis: The
organization and special functions of the nervous system interacting with the
body as a whole and also with the environment produce what we call mental
functions. Note the adjectival form
mental.
So what
about the non-reductive part? I said
above that the main issue is causation.
To say that the mental level of functioning is not reducible is to say
that a complete causal account of what goes on in the world has to take it into
account.
Now it may
be difficult, surprisingly so, to give an argument for the causal difference
that consciousness makes. Philosophers fool around with thought experiments --
couldn't we all be zombies and be doing just exactly the same things that we do
and would anybody ever know the difference.
But the
causal difference made by information processing is totally manifest. For example, the rabbit jumps up when the
light is shown on it and the pound of hamburger doesn't. So it's very clear that the rabbit is
processing information, and we can just tell that by watching what it does.
In my next
lecture, I'm going to talk about downward causation of what we usually think of
as the mental ideas, reasons, etcetera.
But I'm going to put that off until the next lecture because I want to
do that in conjunction with talking about free will.
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